A teoria austríaca do ciclo econômico e a recente crise financeira by ZELMANOVITZ, LEONIDAS
La Calidad Académica,
un Compromiso Institucional
Criterio Libre   ▪   Vol. 9  •  No. 15   ▪   Bogotá (Colombia)   ▪  Julio-Diciembre 2011   ▪   Pp. 23-58
1.
The Austrian Business 
Cycle Theory and the 
recent financial crisis
Leonidas Zelmanovitz
Zelmanovitz, Leonidas 
(2011). The Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory and 
the recent ﬁ nancial crisis
Criterio Libre, 9 (15), 
23-58
ISSN 1900-0642
“Reaching the universe”
24 Universidad Libre
The Austrian Business Cycle Theory and the recent fi nancial crisis
THE AUSTRIAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY 
AND THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS*
 
LEONIDAS ZELMANOVITZ**
 
Fecha de recepción: mayo 20 de 2011
Fecha de aceptación: agosto  26 de 2011
ABSTRACT
The argument presented in this paper is based on the recognition that the 
Austrian Business Cycle Theory is outdated in its description of how the effects 
of monetary phenomena are transmitted to the real sector and produce 
business cycles. In the paper it is argued that there are epistemological 
limitations for successfully preventing infl ationary credit expansions by 
the adoption of Infl ation Targeting policies and that the adoption of such 
policies is the cause of the economic boom that ended in 2007. It is also 
described in the paper how monetary contraction happened, starting in 
September 2008; and that is offered as an explanation for the beginning 
of the downturn. Finally, it is argued in the paper that once started the 
downturn a prudential response by the monetary authorities, one that 
would mimic the reactions of the competing money suppliers in a free 
market would have been, is the proper course of action under the current 
monetary arrangements.
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RESUMEN
LA TEORÍA AUSTRÍACA DEL CICLO ECONÓMICO Y LA RECIENTE CRISIS FINANCIERA
La argumentación de este artículo se basa en el reconocimiento de que la 
Teoría Austríaca del Ciclo Económico está desactualizada en su descripción 
de cómo los efectos del fenómeno monetario son transmitidos al sector real 
y generan ciclos de negocio.
En el artículo se sostiene que hay limitaciones epistemológicas para 
prevenir exitosamente las expansiones inflacionarias por la adopción de 
políticas específicas de inflación y que la adopción de dichas políticas 
es la causa del “boom” económico que terminó en 2007. También 
se describe cómo ocurrió la contracción monetaria empezando en 
septiembre de 2008 y que se ofrece como una explicación para el inicio 
del declive. Finalmente, una vez el declive inició hubo una respuesta 
prudente de las autoridades monetarias. Una respuesta que habría sido la 
imitación de las reacciones de los proveedores de dinero, competidores 
en un mercado libre y que sería el curso de acción apropiado bajo los 
actuales acuerdos monetarios.
Palabras clave: Escuela de Economía Austríaca, ciclo económico, crisis 
financiera.
Clasificación JEL: B25, E44, E65..
RESUMO
A TEORIA AUSTRÍACA DO CICLO ECONÔMICO E A RECENTE CRISE FINANCEIRA
O argumento apresentado neste documento baseia-se no reconhecimento 
de que a teoria austríaca do ciclo econômico não está atualizada na sua 
descrição de como os efeitos dos fenômenos monetários são transmitidos ao 
setor real e produz os ciclos econômicos.
No documento argumenta-se que existem limitações epistemológicas 
para o sucesso da prevenção da expansão inflacionária de crédito 
pela adoção de políticas de metas de inflação e que a adoção destas 
políticas é a causa do boom econômico que terminou em 2007. Também 
se descreve no documento como a contração monetária que aconteceu, 
a partir de setembro de 2008, e que se oferece como uma explicação 
para o começo da recessão. Finalmente, se argumenta no documento que 
uma vez que começou a crise uma resposta prudente das autoridades 
monetárias, haveria sido simular as reações dos provedores de fundos que 
competem em um mercado livre, é o curso de ação apropriado no regime 
monetário atual.
Palavras-chave: Escola de economia austríaca, ciclo econômico, crise 
financeira.
Classificação JEL: B25, E44, E65.
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RÉSUMÉ
LA THÉORIE AUTRICHIENNE DU CYCLE D’AFFAIRES ET DE LA RÉCENTE CRISE FINANCIÈRE
L’argument présenté dans ce document est basé sur la reconnaissance que 
la théorie autrichienne du cycle d’affaires est dépassé dans sa description 
de la façon dont les effets des phénomènes monétaires sont transmises au 
secteur réel et produisent des cycles économiques. Dans le document il est 
fait valoir qu’il ya des limites épistémologiques pour une prévention efficace 
de l’expansion de crédit inflationniste par l’adoption de politiques de cibles 
d’inflation et que l’adoption de que telles politiques sont la cause de l’essor 
économique qui a pris fin en 2007. 
Il est également décrit dans le document comment contraction monétaire 
qui s’est passé, à partir de Septembre 2008 et qui est offert comme une 
explication pour le début de la récession. Enfin, il est soutenu dans le document 
qu’une fois que la récession a commencé une réponse prudentielle par les 
autorités monétaires, qui imiterait les réactions des fournisseurs de l’argent 
en concurrence dans un marché libre aurait été, c’est le bon déroulement de 
l’action sous les arrangements monétaires actuelles.
Mots clés: École autrichienne d’économie, le cycle économique, la crise 
financière.
Classification JEL: B25, E44, E65.
1.  INTRODUCTION
The narrative of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT for short) is well 
known. Departing from the assumptions that money is not neutral and 
financial flows are a mere mirror of what is happening in the real economy, 
the Austrian theorists argue that every time that there is an expansion of 
credit in the economy above the actual availability of saved resources, two 
things happen. First is the Cantillion effect, which refers to the fact that since 
some agents in the economy get the new money first, they spend it first, 
and therefore the burdens and benefits of inflationary credit expansion are 
uneven in the economy. Second, the availability of new money reduces the 
actual interest rate below its notional previous natural level, inducing the 
economic agents in general to engage in investments made viable due to 
a lesser cost of capital; they start to invest specially in more time-consuming, 
capital-intensive forms of production that will demand real resources above 
the actual available resources in the economy. 
For some time, in the upturn of the cycle, the economy will experience over-
consumption and over-investment, with the economic agents guided by 
distorted relative prices (cause and consequence of the way in which the 
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new money is introduced into the economy and 
of the misguided investments). 
Eventually, claims on actual goods for 
consumption or investment reach a point in 
which the economic agents start to compete 
for insufficient available present goods. That 
is the moment in which the upturn side of the 
cycle crests. In order to have access to the 
scarce present goods available in the economy, 
economic agents involved in more roundabout 
forms of production start to bid for capital, that 
is, for the supposedly saved resources available 
to be invested in the production of future goods. 
In a monetary economy, the way in which the 
bidding is done is by demanding financial 
instruments representative of those supposedly 
saved real resources that would allow their 
possessors to have access to all available goods 
in the economy, that is, the generally accepted 
medium of exchange usually known as money.
At that moment, the time mismatch between savings 
and investments caused by the inflationary credit 
expansion, which created competing claims over 
the present goods, reveals itself.
In order to fulfill their obligations in the real sector 
of the economy, the economic agents in the 
financial sector, bankers among them, start to bid 
for money, raising the interest rate. 
The new environment of lesser availability of credit 
and higher interest rates suddenly puts a number 
of misconceived investment projects into the red. 
The prospect of defaults looms and uncertainty 
increases dramatically.
That is the moment in which the downturn begins.
With increased uncertainty, there is an increased 
demand for cash balances. Now it is not only 
that the demand for money reflects the chase for 
available goods in the economy, but also that 
there is an increased demand by the economic 
agents to keep cash balances in order to face 
the uncertainty of the new environment in which 
economic conditions are deteriorating.
Forced liquidation of real assets in order to repay 
debts and to correct the distortions created in the 
structure of production caused by the inflationary 
credit expansion leaves room for some speculative 
investments, and eventually the relative prices will 
be realigned in a more realistic way, ill-conceived 
investments will be purged, and, depending on 
the actions taken in regard to the supply of money 
during the downturn, there will be more or less 
deflation. The Austrian theorists point out that the 
greater the deflation, the faster the liquidation of 
bad investments and the recovery; the trade-off 
of more or less deflation being a faster or more 
prolonged downturn. 
How is one to fit that narrative into what 
has happened and is still happening in the 
present business cycle? The Liberty Fund E09-
4635 Symposium on “Business Cycles and the 
New Economic Reality” came about from the 
realization that an effort to retool the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory narrative was necessary. 
A good economic theory is one able to interpret 
and explain economic reality. If the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory describes a reality of 
worldwide commodity money, no consumer 
credit, relatively insignificant public sector and 
public debt, and most financial activity being 
done through bank loans, it is not talking about 
the world today and, therefore, prima facie, it 
loses its relevance. 
It may successfully be argued that the a priori 
assumptions of the theory, which are based on an 
accepted understanding about human nature and 
how individuals react to the physical and social 
environment in their economic activity, are as 
valid today as they were at the time the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory was developed from the 
1920s to the 1940s. Still, if these assumptions 
were not applied to the world in which we live 
today, that is, if a new narrative is not developed 
based on the same assumptions, the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory may well be regarded 
as something from the past, since the traditional 
narrative of how the transmission and the effects 
of monetary changes is flawed when applied to 
today’s market.
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It is not the purpose here to develop a new 
narrative for the Austrian Business Cycle Theory. 
Actually, my personal conclusion from the E09-
4635 symposium is that the day when someone 
who is able enough to rewrite the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory engages in such project in 
a good “Austrian” tradition, the project should be 
limited to the aprioristic assumptions behind the 
narrative of the business cycles written from the 
1920s to the 1940s. 
That narrative should be considered just one of 
many possible narratives about how a business 
cycle might happen, and among those many other 
possible narratives that may be used to exemplify 
the theory is the one about the present business 
cycle. A different society with a different structure 
of production and with different institutions will 
have a different business cycle in the face of 
inflationary credit expansion.
That is to say that there are real business cycles, 
created by physical or social factors, such as the 
cycles provoked by the discovery and exhaustion 
of mineral resources in a given region, or a cycle 
of industrialization and deindustrialization caused 
by the change from favorable to unfavorable 
institutional arrangements such as labor laws or 
patent laws, for instance. The Austrian Business 
Cycle Theory is not about them. The Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory is about business cycles 
provoked by an increase of claims on present 
goods above the availability of such goods. Such 
inflationary expansion of credit is always the result 
of an increase in production by financial markets 
of credits above the existence of “real” savings. 
So, not all business cycles can be explained by the 
Austrian Business Cycle Theory. However, historical 
experience has shown that the “real” business cycles 
are a class of phenomena very limited in time and 
place, and most of the business cycles we know of 
are provoked by inflationary credit expansion even 
if the pain is compounded by other causes.
No one can deny that the downturn of the 
1930s, the Great Depression, was exacerbated 
by protectionism among many other terrible policy 
“So, not all business cycles 
can be explained by the 
Austrian Business Cycle 
Theory. However, historical 
experience has shown that 
the «real» business cycles are 
a class of  phenomena very 
limited in time and place, and 
most of  the business cycles 
we know of  are provoked 
by inflationary credit 
expansion even if  the pain is 
compounded by other causes.”
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policies as the monetary policy of choice in the 
years before the crisis. Such policies allowed for 
the increase in the liquidity in the economy in 
ways not perceived by the price indexes used 
to gauge those policies. The second monetary 
phenomenon is the increase in the demand 
for money after the Lehman debacle at the 
end of 2008. Such an increase is offered as 
an interpretation for the ongoing contraction 
of inflationary liquidity that resulted in the crisis 
when most economic observers were focused 
on the expansion of the monetary base in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis that started in 
2007. We will start with the effects of inflation 
targeting policies.
mistakes. Still, the main causes for that prolonged 
upturn and sharp downturn were monetary.
I will argue here that the recent financial crisis is 
just the downturn side of a worldwide “Austrian” 
business cycle initiated in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s1. There are factors other than 
monetary ones helping to explain the present 
business cycle, but the primary causes explaining 
the cycle are monetary.
There are two monetary causes. The first one, 
which explains the upturn and is in fact the 
main monetary factor responsible for the crisis, 
was the widespread use of inflation-targeting 
2. “INFLATION TARGETING” AND THE UPTURN OF THE PRESENT   ECONOMIC CYCLE
Since 1990, the “state of the art” in monetary 
policy has been “Inflation Targeting”2. Inflation-
targeting policies have been regarded as capable 
of keeping inflation low under fiat money and 
fluctuating exchange-rate arrangements while 
allowing the “flexibility” to manage monetary 
policy required to support politically the 
“independence” of central banks, namely easing 
credit as an attempt to promote stable growth 
with a minimum of unemployment. 
However, inflation-targeting policies, understood 
as a strategy for monetary management 
conducted more or less in a discretionary form 
aiming primarily at the achievement of a target 
for the variation of consumer’s prices, are neither 
“new”3 nor effective in preventing the boom-and-
bust cycles produced by loose (flexible, if you 
will) monetary management. Instead, these very 
policies are directly responsible for the current 
financial crisis by allowing gross speculation 
with investment assets not “perceived” by the 
general price indexes utilized to gauge those 
policies. Incidentally, that is one of the many 
epistemological arguments that may be raised 
against the use of inflation-targeting policies.  
1 Part of the arguments and evidence presented here were previously discussed: (a) in a working paper on the demand for 
money presented at the Austrian Scholars Conference 2010 at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama and later published in 
the Journal Criterio Libre, year 8, #13, Bogotá (Colombia), edition Julio-Diciembre 2010; (b) in a working paper on inflation 
targeting presented at the III International Conference: Austrian Economics in the XXI Century, in Rosario, Argentina, and 
published by the Journal RIIM of Eseade, Argentina; and (c) in my  dissertation on the philosophy of money for the Doctorate 
in Applied Economics at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Spain.
2 Perhaps the most influential academic paper proposing an inflation target as the central criterion for monetary policy is John B. 
Taylor’s “Discretion Vs. Policy Rules in Practice” (Taylor, 1993). Its main credit, however, is that it endorsed what at that time 
became common practice among central banks. Bernanke et al. (2001), first published in 1999, is also widely quoted in 
academic discussions about inflation targeting for the collection of data supporting the claim for inflation target effectiveness.
3 Proposals “for targeting monetary policy on a broad price index” were already deemed “old” by Professor Yeager in a 1983 
paper (Yeager, 1983: p. 308), and rightly so, since, as this chapter argues, their root may be found in the monetary policy 
of the 1920s. Specifically, the similitude between the 1920s and the 1990s was already perceived, according to Professor 
Barry Eichengreen, who wrote that observers “… see parallels, in other words, between the ‘new economy’ of the 1990s 
and the ‘new age’ of the 1920s” (Eichengreen, 2002: p. 9).
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In order to discuss these ideas, in the following 
pages we will deal with the concept of inflation-
targeting policies, presenting a brief historical 
overview, their key elements, and how to classify 
them in accordance with the traditional modes 
of rules and discretion. Next, a review of the 
performance of monetary policies in selected 
developed countries serves as empirical evidence 
for some of the arguments presented here.   
2.1 THE FORMULATION OF 
“INFLATION-TARGETING POLICIES
On August 15, 1971, the United States, under the 
watch of President Nixon, defaulted on the Bretton 
Woods Agreement and severed the tenuous link 
still existing between the United States dollar and 
gold by closing the “Gold Window” under which 
United States dollars were redeemable by Central 
Banks of signatory countries at the fixed rate of 
$35.00 per ounce. A new short-lived parity was 
established, but in 1973 the fixed-exchange-rate 
monetary regime in force since the end of World 
War II came to an end. Central banks around the 
world scrambled for a new “anchor”.
In a world left only with fluctuating fiat money, the 
only possible “anchor” to the value of a currency 
was a “nominal” one to be implemented at a 
national level.
2.2 PRECURSORS TO INFLATION 
TARGETING
At the beginning, the effort of central banks 
was to make known the evolution (growth) in 
the monetary aggregates, and with them, the 
“expected” changes in the general price levels as 
mechanically derived from the application of the 
Quantitative Theory of Money. 
Pressures to make changes to the goals in terms 
of expansion of the money supply were felt soon. 
Real factors and political factors contributed 
from time to time to force central banks out of 
their stated goals for monetary expansion and 
therefore compromised their credibility. In sum, 
the claim for “discretion” was a constant.  
It was only in 1990 when the New Zealand 
Central Bank adopted an explicit inflation 
target without reference to limits on monetary 
expansion but to a price level goal measured 
by a given price index, that the adoption of 
“inflation-targeting” policy in a narrow sense 
officially began, according to Bernanke et al. 
(2001: 86). 
2.3 WHAT IS INFLATION TARGETING?
But, what is Inflation Targeting? In their 
book Inflation Targeting - Lessons from the 
International Experience, Dr. Bernanke and his 
co-authors offer the following definition: “Inflation 
targeting is a framework for monetary policy 
characterized by the public announcement of 
official quantitative targets (or target ranges) 
for the inflation rate over one or more time 
horizons, and by explicit acknowledgement that 
low, stable inflation is monetary policy’s primary 
long-run goal” (2001: 4).
Since the 1930s most of the debate about 
monetary policies tries to classify them as 
strategies based on either “rules” or “discretion,” 
the Gold Standard being, for instance, a “rule.” A 
discretionary approach happens when a central 
bank makes no public commitment about its 
actions. Dr. Bernanke describes inflation targeting 
as a “framework” in order not to pin it as either a 
“rule” or as a “discretionary” kind of policy.
In other words, under the “framework” of an 
inflation target, the central bank is free to take 
any measure it sees fit, so far and so long as the 
price level at the end of a certain period of time 
comes close to the previously stated price level 
“goal” as measured by the chosen price index. 
Under the inflation target framework, the central 
bank claims to be able to pursue other political 
goals without falling into the discredited monetary 
“activism” of the bad old days before the “Great 
Moderation,” as the period of discreet monetary 
management by the main central banks between 
the start of Paul Volcker’s Chairmanship at the Fed 
and the beginning of the recent financial crises 
became known.
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2.4 KEY ELEMENTS OF INFLATION-
TARGETING POLICIES
One may summarize an inflation-targeting policy 
as composed of two key elements: a high level of 
discretion about the use of the tools available to 
the central bank, and a “formal” commitment to 
keep inflation low. The first component is perceived 
as required by the central bankers to show the 
“strength” of their institutions and, therefore, along 
with the second element, to convey the idea that 
the monetary authorities are committed to a low 
level of inflation and have the power to make it 
come about. 
The advocates of inflation-targeting policies claim it 
is possible to create a “nominal anchor” to the price 
level by the communication to the public of a target 
which would result in certain “psychological” market 
conditions favorable to the achievement of the very 
same inflation goal (Bernanke et al., 2001: 19). 
The public must believe that the Central Bank has 
the power to do one or all of the following: (a) to 
expand or contract the money supply, (b) to raise 
or to lower interest rates, (c) to impose exchange 
controls, (d) to alter the level of compulsory reserves, 
(e) to alter the classes of assets and the conditions 
under which they will grant access to discount 
facilities, and (f) to impose new bank regulations. 
Inflation targeting advocates believe that, if the 
market believes the Central Bank might take any 
of the above steps, along with their stated goal 
of keeping the inflation low, the “psychological” 
conditions will contribute to actually achieving 
the inflation goal. Bernanke could not be clearer 
about the psychological benefits expected from 
using everything available in the central bank 
“tool kit”: “Evidence suggests that the only way for 
central banks to earn credibility is the hard way: 
by demonstrating that they have the means and 
the will to reduce inflation and to keep it low for 
a period of time” (Bernanke et al., 2001: 308). 
Furthermore, the element of discretion offers the 
central bank the capacity to pursue “other” political 
objectives deemed necessary by the circumstances 
without compromising the achievement of the stated 
goal so long as the “psychological” conditions 
remain under control.   
“One may summarize an 
inflation-targeting policy 
as composed of  two key 
elements: a high level of  
discretion about the use 
of  the tools available to 
the central bank, and a 
«formal» commitment to 
keep inflation low.”
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2.5 RULES VS. DISCRETION
Proponents of inflation-targeting policies argue 
that history shows that “rules” are no protection 
against changes in monetary policy. Since 
changing circumstances “require” flexibility, even 
the Gold Standard offers no protection against 
political decisions to suspend payments in gold 
in case of war, for instance.
Therefore, so the argument goes, all monetary 
policies are “discretionary” to a certain degree, 
and so the best you can get is a “framework” 
such as the one provided by the adoption of a 
“nominal” anchor.
2.6 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
FOR INFLATION-TARGETING 
POLICIES
It may be said that these policies are not 
necessarily dependent on any knowledge of 
the actual quantity of money in circulation in the 
economy, since it is possible to practice those 
policies without knowledge of the variations in the 
supply and demand of money that are observed 
and acted upon. That leaves the most frequent 
objection to the idea of inflation targeting to be in 
relation to the time lags between the occurrence of 
imbalances and corrective actions4. That seems to 
me too benevolent an interpretation. Even if price 
indexes could perceive changes in the “general 
price level,” they cannot perceive them with the 
precision necessary for the meaningful practice 
of inflation-targeting policies based on them5. It 
is not only that the corrective actions can only be 
4 See Yeager, 1983: p. 309.
5 In a recent paper on Morgenstern’s contributions, Professor 
Bagus lists a number of problems of limitation of knowledge 
that may influence the quality of the aggregated data 
produced as a price index. For instance, he mentions that 
some goods have more than one publicly quoted price, 
and that many goods and services have non-monetary 
components to their prices. He argues, “These non-
monetary components of prices are, of course, relevant 
for an econometrician who wants to test the hypothesis 
that changes in the money supply have an influence on 
prices” (Bagus, 2010: p. 14).  
“The historically low 
levels of  inflation achieved 
under the inflation-targeting 
framework wherever it has 
been adopted, according to 
its proponents, seem to prove 
that it is the solution for price 
stability under fiat money and 
fluctuating exchange rates. 
The statistical record gives 
credit to that assessment, at 
least until the beginning of  
the current financial crisis.”
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taken when the effects of the disturbances have 
already occurred6, but also that it is not possible to 
know how the transmission of monetary changes 
into the real sector has occurred and, therefore, 
how it could be “corrected”. That is to say, there is 
a qualitative dimension that cannot be perceived 
by quantitative measurements, regardless of 
how precise they are meant to be. A final 
epistemological question in regard to the practice 
of inflation-targeting policies is that they may be 
regarded as having been developed precisely 
to address the limitations of knowledge afflicting 
policies targeting quantitative measurements of the 
money supply in vogue before the 1990s, and 
therefore a step in the right direction. Evidently 
inflation-targeting policies assume it is necessary 
to know much less than policies applying 
the quantitative theory of money to monetary 
aggregates; but, as it is argued here, they still 
assume more than is reasonable to assume to be 
known or even knowable at all7.
2.7 MONETARY POLICY SINCE 1990
Since the precursory adoption of an inflation-
targeting policy in New Zealand, with different 
grades of formality and public commitment, the 
establishment of price level goals by the monetary 
authorities without any other commitment to how 
to achieve that goal has become the common 
practice around the globe.
2.8 TRACK RECORD OF INFLATION-
TARGETING POLICIES
The historically low levels of inflation achieved 
under the inflation-targeting framework 
wherever it has been adopted, according to its 
proponents, seem to prove that it is the solution 
for price stability under fiat money and fluctuating 
exchange rates. The statistical record gives credit 
to that assessment, at least until the beginning of 
the current financial crisis. 
In order to analyze the validity of the proponents 
of inflation-targeting policies’ claims, Table 1 
shows the Consumer Price Indexes of nine selected 
developed countries with data from 1970 to 2007. 
2.8.1 The Final Years under
 the Bretton Woods Treaty
Until February 1973, the international monetary 
arrangements were the ones established in 
1944 by the Treaty of Bretton Woods with fixed 
exchange rates pegging all currencies of the 
signing countries to a United States dollar, until 
1971, convertible (only by their correspondent 
central banks) in gold at a fixed parity of $35.00 
per ounce. However, the charter above shows 
that the average inflation level in the nine selected 
developed countries for the period 1970–1972 
was well above five percent per year. Those 
arrangements were clearly unsustainable in the 
long run, being incompatible with a regime of 
fixed exchange rates. The weakened link to the 
Gold Standard provided by the Bretton Woods 
Treaty until August 1971 proved to be insufficient 
to check inflationary expansions of the money 
supply among the Western developed countries 
and the abandonment of those arrangements 
became inevitable. 
2.8.2 In Search of a New “Anchor”
 for the Value of Monies
The American default on its obligation to redeem 
the United States dollar in gold under the Bretton 
6 Incidentally, the time lag may be considered as yet another epistemological objection to inflation targeting, since it is only 
after the monetary disturbances are perceived by the price index that monetary authorities will have the information that some 
corrective action is necessary.
7 Professor Bagus emphasizes the fact that the exact knowledge assumed to exist in order to practice inflation-targeting policies 
is actually nonexistent when he states that error estimates are not provided in econometrics because “there is not a precise 
way of calculating them” (Bagus, 2010: p. 28).
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Year USA Canada Japan France Germany Italy Sweden Swiss UK
1970 5.9 3.3 7.6 5.9 3.4 5.0 7.0 3.6 6.4
1971 4.2 2.9 6.4 5.5 5.2 4.9 7.4 6.6 9.5
1972 3.3 4.9 4.8 6.2 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.7 7.1
1973 6.3 7.6 11.7 7.3 7.0 10.8 6.7 8.8 9.2
1974 11.0 10.9 23.2 13.7 7.0 19.1 9.9 9.8 16.0
1975 9.1 10.7 11.7 11.8 5.9 17.1 9.8 6.7 24.3
1976 5.8 7.6 9.4 9.6 4.3 16.7 10.3 1.7 16.7
1977 6.5 8.0 8.2 9.4 3.7 18.5 11.4 1.3 15.8
1978 7.6 9.0 4.2 9.0 2.7 12.0 10.0 1.1 8.6
1979 11.3 9.1 3.7 10.8 4.1 14.8 7.2 3.7 12.6
1980 13.5 10.2 7.8 13.0 5.5 21.3 13.7 4.0 16.9
1981 10.4 12.4 4.9 13.3 6.3 19.5 12.1 6.5 12.2
1982 4.0 10.7 2.8 12.0 5.3 16.5 8.6 5.7 8.5
1983 5.3 5.9 1.9 9.5 3.3 14.6 8.9 3.0 5.2
1984 4.4 4.4 2.3 7.7 2.4 10.9 8.0 2.9 4.5
1985 3.5 4.0 2.0 5.8 2.1 9.1 7.4 3.5 5.2
1986 1.9 4.2 0.6 2.5 -0.1 5.8 4.2 0.8 3.6
1987 3.7 4.4 0.1 3.3 0.2 4.8 4.2 1.4 4.1
1988 4.1 4.0 0.7 2.7 1.3 5.1 5.8 1.9 4.6
1989 4.8 5.0 2.3 3.5 2.8 6.3 6.4 3.1 5.9
1990 5.4 4.8 3.1 3.4 2.7 6.5 10.5 5.4 8.2
1991 4.2 5.6 3.3 3.2 3.5 6.3 9.3 5.9 6.8
1992 3.0 1.5 1.7 2.4 5.1 5.3 2.3 4.0 4,7
1993 3.0 1.8 1.2 2.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 3.3 3.0
1994 2.6 0.2 0.7 1.7 2.7 4.1 2.2 0.9 2.4
1995 2.8 2.2 -0.1 1.8 1.8 5.3 2.5 1.8 3.5
1996 3.0 1.5 0.1 2.0 1.4 4.0 0.5 0.8 2.4
1997 2.3 1.7 1.9 1.2 1.9 2.0 0.7 0.5 3.1
1998 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.0 2.0 -0.3 0.0 3.4
1999 2.2 1.8 -0.3 0.5 0.6 1.7 0.5 0.9 1.5
2000 3.3 2.7 -0.8 1.7 1.4 2.5 0.9 1.5 3.0
2001 2.8 2.5 -0.7 1.7 1.9 2.7 2.4 1.0 1.8
2002 1.6 2.2 -0.9 1.9 1.5 2.5 2.2 0.6 1.7
2003 2.3 2.8 -0.3 2.1 1.0 2.7 1.9 0.6 2.9
2004 2.7 1.8 0.0 2.1 1.7 2.2 0.4 0.8 3.0
2005 3.4 2.2 -0.3 1.8 1.5 2.0 0.5 1.1 2.8
2006 3.2 2.0 0.3 1.6 1.6 2.1 1.4 1.1 3.2
2007 2.8 2.2 0.0 1.5 2.3 1.8 2.2 0.7 4.3
Table 1. Consumer Price Indexes selected developed countries 1970-20078: (percentage changes 
based on national price indexes published by each country)*
*The data has not been adjusted for comparability. National differences exist.
Sources: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov/fls/flscpian.pdf), International Monetary Fund, (www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2000/02/data/index.htm).
8 The countries shown on the table were selected because they are representative of modern Western societies as a result of the 
size of their economies and their leadership in institutional developments. These percentage changes are based on national 
price indexes as published by each country.
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Woods Treaty came as a shock to financial 
markets worldwide. The impacts were huge and 
long-lasting. From 1973 until 1983, we saw 
an increase in prices in the selected countries 
at the time that they were striving to find a new 
“anchor” for the value of their currencies. That was 
the period of failed attempts to control inflation, 
establishing targets for the growth of monetary 
aggregates. Figure 1 below shows the price of 
gold in United States dollars for the period 1964 
to 1984. It shows that until 1968, world markets 
perceived that the promise by the American 
government to redeem United States dollars at the 
agreed parity of $35.00 per ounce was credible. 
From 1968 to 1971, when the pledge was finally 
broken, the increases in the gold prices showed 
that the confidence in that promise had somewhat 
diminished. Under the Smithsonian Agreement of 
December 1971, an attempt to fix exchange rates 
at a devalued United States dollar without a link 
to actual gold faced skepticism, and in 1971 gold 
closed at the record price of $44.20 per ounce. 
In February 1973, the Bretton Woods exchange 
market formally closed, reopening in March 1973 
in a floating regime. From that year onwards, the 
increase of gold prices in United States dollars 
reflected more correctly the devaluation of the 
United States dollar in gold terms than an increase 
in the price of gold as a single commodity.
2.8.3 The Years of Recovering Credibility
1984 is the first of a number of years in which 
the data shows the results of more conservative 
policies adopted by monetary authorities in 
developed countries. The galloping inflation 
during the Carter Presidency led Mr. Paul Volker 
to the head of the Fed. Mr. Volker implemented 
a monetary policy of quantitative control of 
monetary aggregates that eventually curbed 
increases in consumer prices. Similar policies 
had been adopted in Europe since 1979 with 
the creation of the European Monetary System. 
But in order to impose an effective control on 
the growth of monetary aggregates, these 
policies resulted, as a byproduct, in a short but 
significant recession during the year 1980 with 
a double dip at the end of 1981, beginning 
of 1982. Although those policies proved 
successful, eventually new inflationary pressures 
came into the scenario. And regardless of 
how brief a recession is, it is something many 
political circles find intolerable, which is the 
reason why policymakers continue to listen to 
cries for more “discretionary” policies coming 
from political representatives of almost every 
persuasion aside from classical liberals, every 
time the economy in a country with a central 
bank enters a downturn. 
Figure 1. Average price of gold for the period 1964 to 1984
Source: National Mining Association (www.nma.org/pdf/gold/his_gold_prices.pdf)
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2.8.4 New Inflationary Pressures
 and the adoption of Inflation-
 Targeting Policies
More conservative monetary policies became 
fashionable. However, three events of historical 
proportions may explain the increase in the 
general price levels until 1991. The first of them 
was Black Monday in October 1987 when the 
stock market in the United States plunged, and 
the recently appointed Fed Chairman, Mr. Alan 
Greenspan, took charge of the problem by 
flooding the market with dollars. The second 
one was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1988 
with the required effort made by developed 
countries to integrate the Eastern European 
countries into the new world order. The third 
one was the invasion of Kuwait and the first 
war in the Persian Gulf with the corresponding 
shock in the world oil supply.
No doubt the massive inflationary expansion 
determined by those events resulted in increases 
in the consumer price indexes in the selected 
countries. But they were counterweighted by the 
concomitant increases in productivity generated 
by the enlargement of the division of labor with: 
(a) the integration of China and the countries 
behind the Iron Curtain into the world markets, 
(b) liberalization of trade worldwide with the 
creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), (c) the benefits in terms of lower 
barriers for the trade of goods, labor, services, 
and finances in an expanded Euro-zone with 
the final adoption of the Euro in 1999, and, 
last but not least, (d) advances in Information 
Technology.
A twenty-year period of prosperity had begun, that 
is, the upturn of the present business cycle. Foreign 
trade was the real motor behind the miracle, and 
economic expansion and increasing tax revenues 
lessened the political cost of adopting relatively 
more conservative fiscal policies in developed 
countries.  
With a regained credibility in their management 
of fiscal and monetary policy, governments and 
“In any society, the capacity 
to concede «credit» is limited, 
constrained by some actual 
factors and, in the long 
run, not influenced by the 
nominal quantity of  money in 
circulation.”
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monetary authorities started to adopt, explicitly or 
tacitly, the inflation-targeting framework9.
The adoption of the inflation-target framework 
perfectly coincides with the beginning of the 
twenty-year expansion mentioned above. The 
inflation-target framework has been credited for 
the prosperity experienced until 2007. Claims 
have been made that it is the “perfect” balance 
between rules and discretion in monetary 
policy. 
What remains to be assessed is to what extent 
the current crisis either proved that inflation-
targeting policy is the best strategy possible 
for monetary policy, since it gives room for the 
monetary authorities to react to the crisis with 
every instrument at their disposal; or proved to be 
no more than a new dress for the recurrent mistake 
of credit expansion that in the end caused the 
crisis. Having being presented with what inflation 
targeting is and in which circumstances it became 
the monetary policy of choice worldwide, this 
paper will now address its responsibility for the 
recent crisis with the claim that those policies, in 
their disregard for changes in the money supply, 
so long as the changes in the price level as 
gauged by some price index of choice are close 
to the target, have allowed inflationary credit 
expansion, directly responsible for the boom that 
preceded the crises, as predicted by the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory (ABCT).
2.8.5 Limits to the Capacity of Giving Credit
In any society, the capacity to concede “credit” is 
limited, constrained by some actual factors and, 
in the long run, not influenced by the nominal 
quantity of money in circulation. Thinking about a 
hypothetical moneyless society may help explain 
this topic: the capacity of a society to allow 
some individuals to consume goods “on credit” 
is limited by its capacity to make those goods 
available. Its capacity to meet the demand for 
goods can be addressed in a number of different 
ways. First, a society can restrict the consumption 
by some of its members; second, a society can 
increase production, to the extent that the inputs 
are available or can also be bought by credit; 
and finally, a society can borrow those goods from 
other societies. Putting money back into the picture, 
we can see that giving “credit,” i.e., lending money 
to some individuals, may allow them to dispose 
of the available goods, but it cannot make more 
goods available in the long run. 
But why this qualification about the “long run”? 
In open, capitalist, monetary societies, the price 
system serves the function of signaling the demand 
for some goods. However, the price system cannot 
differentiate existing money from “new” money 
for some time. Until the economic agents start to 
perceive the inflation of the medium of exchange 
and start acting accordingly, an increase of the 
supply of the medium of exchange will produce 
a dislocation of goods into the hands of the 
individuals that got the new money first from the 
hands of the issuer, and this dislocation may well 
result in increased production either domestically 
or abroad. But again, as soon as the economic 
agents take notice of what is going on, they 
will take the increased supply of fiat money 
into consideration and start acting accordingly; 
i.e., they will assume a certain constant rate of 
devaluation on the real, constant value expected 
for the currency. As soon as the inflationary 
9 The United States is one of those countries where, to this day, inflation targets are not formally adopted; nevertheless, 
American monetary policy is guided primarily with a focus on the inflation rate. In Mr. Alan Greenspan’s memoirs he defends 
keeping the Fed Funds rate unchanged in 1994; he argues that it was the first time since the 1960s that the inflation rate had 
been under a three percent rate per year for three consecutive years. About the monetary policy in 1996, in the seventh year 
of the most consistent bull market in record, he argues that the Fed “has no explicit mandate under the law to try to contain a 
stock market bubble” and that it was established that “price stability is central to long-term economic growth.” In December 
of that year, the famous concept of “irrational exuberance” was offered during a speech at the American Enterprise Institute’s 
annual dinner, yet there was no change to the inflationary easy credit policy since the consumer price indexes did not show 
any impact from that policy (Greenspan 2007: 178).
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expectations are taken into account, the supply of 
goods will not increase because of increases in 
the money supply at the expected rate. 
Furthermore, there is no way to assess what “short 
term” is, what the “proper” amount of money is to 
increase in order to have this or that increase in 
production as a result, and more importantly, it is 
impossible to know the unintended consequences 
of messing with the money supply, as historical 
examples attest. If the money holders in a 
particular society have all the money that they 
want to hold, the introduction of more of the 
“monetary merchandise” to the money stock will 
only depreciate the value of such merchandise. It 
is impossible to generate, enhance, or facilitate 
the production of more goods by adding money 
to the existing stock unless there is a demand for 
it10. Once the demand for liquidity is satisfied, the 
excess money added to the stock of money will 
only produce “devaluation” of the real value of 
the currency in face of the prices of the available 
goods, i.e., what is generally called “inflation”. At 
the time that the narrative of the Austrian Business 
Cycle Theory was developed, the generally 
accepted medium of exchange used to be 
redeemable for a real merchandise, like a piece 
of specie, the introduction of money in circulation 
in excess of the demand for money would (a) 
domestically result in the concentration of bullion 
in the more conservative banks as a consequence 
of the operation of the “reflux mechanism”11 and 
(b) internationally it would lead to the exportation 
of bullion, self-correcting the liquidity level to that 
desired by the money holders without increasing 
the amount of credit available in the long run. 
Incidentally, it was already noted in nineteenth-
century England that the operation of this external 
drain of specie would only work in order to 
keep neither the monetary system “neutral”, i.e., 
neither promoting nor reducing the business cycle 
under a hypothetical purely metallic currency as 
described by Hume in his essay “Of the Balance 
of Trade” (Hume, 1987: 308). Under the gold 
reserve system with a central bank of that time, its 
effects were not immediately perceived, as they 
took some time to happen, as Professor White 
mentions (1995: 115). Now, in our time of fiat 
money, increases in the money supply tend to 
lead straight, although not immediately and not in 
any direct correlation, to “debasement” of money 
value as a medium of exchange. That is what 
the gauge of inflation targets by price indexes 
10 Every society has in any given moment a structure of production composed by the sum of buildings, equipments, inventories, 
and individuals engaged in productive activities. They operate in a given cycle of production, shorter for industrialized goods 
of consumption, longer for agricultural goods, perhaps even longer for capital goods. Every structure of production requires 
a certain liquidity expressed by a quantity of medium of exchange available in order to operate the economic transactions. 
This quantity of medium of exchange can be available because the economic agents themselves have enough capital to do 
their transactions or it can be made available through credit. But the fact is that, at any given moment, the economic agents 
require neither more nor less money than is necessary to make their transactions. This can be considered the “optimum” 
amount of money, and this optimum varies all the time with the variation of the circumstances. A necessity of increasing 
inventories or expanding productive capacity through the introduction of new technology or fixed assets may demand 
increases in the optimum amount of money; on the other hand, better management techniques and lean production process 
may liberate resources and imply a reduction of the money demanded by that society at that moment. This understanding is 
a generalization of the “Needs of Trade Doctrine” advocated by the members of the “Banking School” in the debates on 
monetary policy in the middle of the nineteenth century in Britain. Although their arguments were in favor of allowing the local 
banks to have some elasticity on the issuance of bank-notes in different regions of Great Britain at different times during the 
year in order to accommodate the “needs of trade” (White, 1995: 123), their arguments may be accepted as a general 
principle about money, given the “stiffness” of price and contracts, since in those circumstances the adjustment cannot be done 
as easily by price changes.
11 The reflux mechanism operates under a gold reserve system in which bank notes are cleared among different and competing 
issuing banks, as in the case of Scotland during the second half of the nineteenth century. A more aggressive bank would 
have systematically negative balances at the daily clearing and would be forced to give reserves to the more conservative 
ones, inducing the aggressive bank to scale back and start to operate at the same level of exposure as the other banks. 
However, this mechanism is not a guarantee against a general expansion of the bank’s leverage, as pointed out by J.R. 
McCulloch and quoted by Professor Lawrence White (1995: 103).
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fails to capture. You may have a “run” in certain 
classes of assets without perceptible changes in 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI), or even more 
broad indexes, since price indexes in general do 
not consider changes in asset prices. 
Contrariwise, limiting the supply of money only 
to financing the necessities of trade as intended 
by the followers of the “Real Bills Doctrine” is 
to neglect that money performs a much broader 
role in society than fostering the commercial 
operations in the narrow sense meant by its 
proponents12 .
12 For the members of the Banking School, under the 
“Real Bills Doctrine” (RBD for short), banks should be 
allowed to issue banknotes in any quantity demanded 
by merchants presenting bills of exchange against other 
merchants. The main fallacies of this doctrine in regard 
to its sufficiency to control the supply of credit-money 
and therefore the price level, such as the “nominalist” 
fallacy and the “inelastic supply of bills” fallacy were 
well exposed by Professor White (1995: 122). The 
key issue in regard to the “Real Bills Doctrine” is that 
it may be understood as an effective guide to prudent 
commercial bank management, but nothing more than 
that may be expected from it. It is not a guide for the 
central bank policy, if there is a central bank in the 
system under consideration, and it is not sufficient to 
guarantee the stability of the supply of money and the 
price level. The doctrine was elaborated before the 
1844 Peel’s Act, at a time that the gold standard in 
operation in England was without an institutionalized 
and monopolistic central bank. The control of the 
supply of money was not a result of the operation 
of the RBD, but of the operations of a gold standard 
without a central bank in which the external component 
of the economy was by and large kept automatically 
under control by the Humean mechanism. If you have 
a gold standard in operation, and no central bank 
to discount bills as a lender of last resort that you 
could rely on, the prudent management of a private 
bank giving credit only on short term and against self-
liquidating good collateral and not engaging with 
short-term funding in long-term or risky financing such 
as industrial or agricultural lending seems reasonable. 
But the application of such a doctrine as a policy guide 
to the central bank even under a gold standard or, 
worse, under a fiat money institutional arrangement is a 
compounded mistake. It is to assume that the doctrine 
has an inbuilt mechanism to control the supply of money 
when it does not, and it is to assume that the doctrine 
was meant to guide public policy, which it is not. Trying 
to apply the doctrine outside the context in which it 
was developed for a purpose different from its original 
purpose is a compounded mistake. I would like to thank 
Professor Rolf Luders for clarifying this point to me.   
“Contrariwise, limiting 
the supply of  money only 
to financing the necessities 
of  trade as intended by the 
followers of  the «Real Bills 
Doctrine» is to neglect that 
money performs a much 
broader role in society than 
fostering the commercial 
operations in the narrow sense 
meant by its proponents.”
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2.8.6 Fractional Reserve Banking
 and Moral Hazards
From the previous paragraphs, one may 
conclude that the monetary flows of money to 
and from today’s banking system of fractional 
reserve do not increase the capacity of the 
economic agents in a given society to concede 
more credit than the actual availability of goods 
not necessary for consumption would allow. 
Any attempt to artificially expand credit would 
end only reflecting in the monetary side of the 
economy the creation of concurrent claims over 
the available goods, producing changes in 
the general prices and changes in the relative 
prices of the different goods and services. But 
if that is the case, where do the incentives for 
bankers to expand credit under fractional reserve 
arrangements come from? They come from the 
commitment of the lender of last resort to rescue 
the banks anytime the bankers misjudge how 
much of the deposits on demand they must keep 
available, therefore creating a moral hazard 
that only encourages more reckless behavior, 
exacerbating the economic crisis (Huerta de 
Soto, 2006: 636).
At the time that the Austrian Business Cycle Theory 
traditional narrative was written, the banking 
system was already arranged under fractional 
reserve rules, so there is no difference in the 
narrative here in concluding that the institution 
of fractional reserve banking is, in essence, a 
privilege granted to the bankers that allows them 
to have access to present goods and services that 
are saved by some economic agents in society 
for future and not immediate consumption. That 
leads eventually to the cycles of boom and boost 
in the economy as described by the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory with all the deleterious 
consequences associated with them.
In the years of plenty before the beginning of the 
recent financial crisis, inflation-targeting policies 
have allowed inflationary credit expansion, since 
its effects were not captured by the selected price 
indexes. Those policies failed to limit the creation 
of imbalances in the real sector of economic 
“At the time that the 
Austrian Business Cycle 
Theory traditional narrative 
was written, the banking 
system was already arranged 
under fractional reserve rules, 
so there is no difference in the 
narrative here in concluding 
that the institution of  
fractional reserve banking is, 
in essence, a privilege granted 
to the bankers that allows 
them to have access to present 
goods and services that are 
saved by some economic agents 
in society for future and not 
immediate consumption. ”
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activity and it is easy to understand how: they lack 
any mechanism to limit the expansion of money 
substitutes so long as increases in the level of 
consumer prices are close to what the authorities 
judge tolerable. Under such policies new forms 
of inflationary credit expansion became possible, 
adding a new narrative to the ways in which an 
Austrian Business Cycle may occur. 
13 Obviously, it is not any quantity of base money that will be absorbed by the money-holders; it is not any quantity of credit 
money that could be generated by the banking system leveraging the available amount of base money without significant 
and considerably fast impact on the purchasing power of money. But, to the extent that the initial circumstances permit, 
substantial amounts of financial claims over and above the increase in real savings can be created under the current monetary 
arrangements almost everywhere until it starts to compromise the purchasing power of money and the credibility of the 
banking system.       
3. THE EFFECTS OF THE INCREASE IN THE DEMAND FOR MONEY   AFTER SEPTEMBER 2008
3.1 CHANGES IN THE DEMAND FOR 
MONEY
Fluctuations in the supply of money and credit may 
produce upturns and downturns in the economic 
activity, and the fluctuations under today’s 
fractional banking arrangements, everything else 
being equal, are expected to be sharper than 
under arrangements with 100% reserves. But it 
is important to note that fractional banking is 
good not only in increasing the money supply, 
but also in decreasing the money supply. So, 
under the monetary regimes today, there are not 
only moments in which the money supply can 
increase with few constraints in the short run, 
but also moments in which it can decrease very 
dramatically13.
A parallel phenomenon is the one of variations in 
the demand for money.  Obviously, supply and 
demand for money are related in a number of 
different ways –the most obvious of them is that 
when the supply of money increases to the point 
of affecting its purchasing power, it is reasonable 
to expect that the demand for holding money 
tends to decrease. But there are many other 
ways in which they are interconnected, and this 
essay will discuss particularly the one in which 
an increase in the demand for money leads to a 
decrease in the money supply at the turning point 
of an upturn into a downturn in the business cycle. 
That happens when some monetary instruments 
cease to be money, that is, lose their monetary 
properties in the middle of a “flight to liquidity”.
So, under today’s monetary arrangements, at the 
tipping point of the business cycle, the central 
bank can allow the money supply to increase, 
to decrease, or it can attempt to keep the money 
supply constant. Although these options will not be 
discussed in this paper, it is part of the argument 
presented here that the variations in the demand 
for money must be taken into consideration in the 
central bank’s decision about which course of 
action to follow.
But more than that, what this essay argues is that 
none of the possible courses of action open to the 
central bank leads to an optimum result for society. 
It is true that with this paper a prescription is 
suggested about which course of action the central 
bank should adopt in face of an increased demand 
for money at the beginning of a downturn, but 
much more than deciding which monetary policy 
to follow under those circumstances, because of the 
unsatisfactory result achieved, the entire exercise 
must be understood as an argument against the 
current monetary regime.      
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3.2 THE DEMAND FOR MONEY
There is a difference between the amount of 
money that each individual uses during any given 
day to perform his transactions and the amount of 
money that he aims to keep at the end of the day. 
The latter may be referred as “cash balance,” and 
it is the aggregate preference of all economic 
agents for holding cash balances that represent 
the demand for money in society.
3.3 THE SUPPLY OF MONEY
The supply of money, on the other hand, may 
be supplied competitively or by a monopoly14. 
Money is supplied competitively when there is 
no legal forced tender, i.e., when there is no 
legal provision mandating the use of a given 
currency by the economic agents, and there is a 
monopoly of the money supply when such legal 
provision is in force.
3.4 MONEY IS LIKE 
 ANY OTHER ECONOMIC GOOD
All economic goods may be classified into three 
categories: i) capital goods, ii) consumer goods, 
and iii) media of exchange. Since the utility of 
media of exchange is a consequence of their 
instrumentality for the acquisition of other goods, 
some authors classify them as capital goods. 
Whether or not the medium of exchange is a 
capital good is not a relevant issue for the topic 
discussed in this paper15. What is relevant is the 
fact that money is an economic good like capital 
and consumer goods and, therefore, money 
is subject to the same laws that command the 
behavior of individuals in relation to those goods.
3.5 MONEY IS A GENERALLY 
ACCEPTED MEDIUM OF 
EXCHANGE
The definition of money adopted in this essay is 
the GAMOE definition of money: that money is 
the Generally Accepted Medium of Exchange16.
This paper contends that the Generally Accepted 
Medium of Exchange in society is subject to the 
laws of supply and demand in a similar fashion 
to any other economic good.
Due to the fact that money is generally not only the 
medium of exchange but also the unit of account 
in society, the variation of its price in relation to 
all other goods must be understood as a change 
in its purchasing power17.
So, until now, it was said that like any other 
economic good, money is subject to the laws of 
supply and demand; money is an economic good 
that derives its utility from its use as a medium of 
exchange; the aggregated amount of money that 
each economic agent chooses to keep as cash 
balance is the demand for money; and that the 
supply of money may be institutionally framed 
14 For the purposes of this work, when a monopoly of the money supply is referred to, a monopoly created by law is what is 
meant and not a natural monopoly in the supply of money that may arise spontaneously under a competitive framework. 
15 For a discussion on money as a capital good, see Barnett and Block (2005).
16 The GAMOE definition of money was first developed by Carl Menger, it assumes that money is a spontaneous social 
institution, that it is developed in society in order to facilitate economic transactions and therefore to allow and enhance the 
division of labor by diminishing the transaction costs of bartering. It is important to note, in accepting the GAMOE definition 
of money that the other two main functions of money –i.e., its capacity to be used as a unit of account and as a store of 
value–are derived from its central attribute. 
17 If the GAMOE definition of money is accepted, money becomes anything that comes to be generally accepted as a medium 
of exchange. So, not only commodity money, but also fiat money, bank deposits available on demand, and credit instruments 
with extremely high liberative power may be considered money under this definition. In fact, the distinction between money 
and quasi-money becomes somewhat blurred. That is so because, given some circumstances, some financial instruments may 
lose or acquire liquidity even to a degree of becoming “money,” while a fiat currency may totally lose the confidence of the 
money holders and cease to be considered money. As written by Professor Leland Yeager in his book The Fluttering Veil, 
“At some point, apparently, the shading or drift from the properties of close near moneys toward those of money become a 
jump from a difference in degree to a difference in kind” (Yeager, 1997: 109).
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to be provided competitively by the market or 
monopolistically by the state.
3.6 WHY KEEP A CASH BALANCE?
Going forward, an intriguing question that may 
be asked is, why do the economic agents choose 
to keep cash balances?
Since the utility provided by money is a 
consequence of its attribute of being generally 
accepted in exchange for other goods, it is in 
this “stored potential” to have ready access to the 
available economic goods in the market that one 
must search for the answer.
It has been said that if the individuals had perfect 
knowledge about the future, no money would 
be necessary: “… the main function of money 
for most people is to bridge the gap between 
present and future, which is necessitated by the 
uncertainty of the latter. If the future were known 
with certainty, there would be no need for money” 
(Barnett II and Block, 2005: 189).
Obviously, the above quoted statement is just 
an exaggeration made by its authors in order to 
stress a point. After all, money is needed in order 
to ease the daily transactions of the economic 
agents, and even if they knew the future “with 
certainty,” the inflows and outflows of cash of 
each family and business are uneven. Also, one 
must not forget that there are higher transaction 
costs in buying and selling any other form of 
wealth.
Exaggeration though it is, the link between 
uncertainty about the future and the decision of 
keeping cash balances is crucial to understanding 
the demand for money. In the words of Mises:
“The uncertainty of the future makes it seem 
advisable to hold a larger or smaller part of one’s 
possessions in a form that will facilitate a change 
from one way of using wealth to another, or 
transition from the ownership of one good to that 
of another, in order to preserve the opportunity 
of being able without difficulty to satisfy urgent 
“Since the utility provided by 
money is a consequence of  its 
attribute of  being generally 
accepted in exchange for other 
goods, it is in this “stored 
potential” to have ready access 
to the available economic 
goods in the market that one 
must search for the answer.”
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demands that may possibly arise in the future for 
goods that will have to be obtained by way of 
exchange” (Mises, 1980: 170).
As can be easily understood, aside from the 
uncertainty regarding the future, there are many 
factors influencing the amount of cash balances 
that the economic agents may choose to keep at 
any given time.
The level of sophistication of financial instruments, 
for instance, plays a role in determining the 
demand for money; if the transaction costs to 
invest in income-generating financial assets are 
relatively low, money can be transferred into 
financial investments and back into cash more 
often, in shorter periods of time than otherwise, 
diminishing the necessity of holding cash in order 
to pay for expected transactions during those 
periods18.
The short-term interest rate is obviously one more 
key element to consider when determining how 
much cash balance each economic agent would 
like to keep. 
3.7 PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM 
VARIATIONS IN THE SUPPLY 
 AND DEMAND FOR MONEY
It may be the case that when the institutional 
monetary framework is such that the supply of 
money is provided competitively, the problems 
that may arise to accommodate the supply and 
demand for money are of a lesser magnitude than 
when the supply of money is monopolistically 
provided by the state, since the adjustments of 
supply and demand for money are operated by 
the interaction of the preferences of economic 
agents, each one with his or her own marginal 
utility, and not by the guessing of a central banker.
18 All the classical models for the demand of money 
compare the opportunity costs of the expected gains 
with interest-bearing financial instruments, considered 
net of the transaction costs to move money to and from 
financial instruments.
“As confirmed by empirical 
evidence time and again, 
granting some room for «real» 
causes for business cycles as 
mentioned in the introduction, 
the economic crisis, recessions, 
and depressions are nothing 
more than the more or less 
prolonged and severe period 
(according to the circumstances 
of  each business cycle) of  time 
required for the corrections 
of  all the misallocations 
provoked by the inflationary 
expansions of  the money 
supply complete their course.”
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When the supply of money is provided by a state 
monopoly a common problem is an inflationary 
increase in the money supply. In this case, a 
predictable consequence is a decrease of the 
purchasing power of the medium of exchange. 
Other consequences result from all sorts of 
misallocations that the non-neutral characteristic of 
these variations in the money supply may cause.
As confirmed by empirical evidence time and 
again, granting some room for “real” causes for 
business cycles as mentioned in the introduction, 
the economic crisis, recessions, and depressions 
are nothing more than the more or less prolonged 
and severe period (according to the circumstances 
of each business cycle) of time required for the 
corrections of all the misallocations provoked by 
the inflationary expansions of the money supply 
complete their course.
But periods of economic crisis are moments 
of increased uncertainty and, as mentioned 
above, uncertainty about the future is one of the 
key elements that may drive an increase in the 
demand for money.
3.8 HOW THE DEMAND FOR MONEY 
CHANGED DURING THE RECENT 
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Since the definition of money adopted in this 
work is the GAMOE definition, the use here of the 
concept of “money supply” must be understood 
not only as variations in the monetary base, but 
variations in the monetary aggregates as well. 
For instance, prior to the financial crisis that 
started in 2007, certain credit instruments such 
as Mortgage Backed Securities issued by 
Government Sponsored Entities (GSE –quasi-
governmental Federal agencies with the implicit 
support of the United States Treasury), such as 
the mortgage securitization giants FANNIE MAE 
and FREDDIE MAC, were deemed by the agents 
in the international capital market to be as liquid 
as the invested assets of money market mutual 
funds. Money market funds being a form of 
investment with next day availability (D+1), with 
virtually no transaction costs, assets parked in 
these funds have indirectly acquired practically 
the same liquidity as resources deposited in 
checking accounts. At the peak of the financial 
crisis, however, these mortgage-backed securities 
lost their former level of credibility, and risked 
being traded at a discount. If that had been 
allowed to happen, with the loss of their liquidity, 
they would have ceased to be perceived as 
possessing quasi-monetary attributes, and the 
trillions of United States dollars invested in those 
assets in a matter of days at the end of 2008 
would have ceased, for all practical purposes, to 
be considered by the economic agents as quasi-
money, as they had before. That was the rationale 
behind the movement of trillions of United States 
dollars in a matter of hours away from money 
market funds (MMFs) in the direction of checking 
accounts. It also explains some of the desperate 
measures undertaken by the American monetary 
authorities at that time, such as the takeover of 
those entities by the American Treasury, making 
explicit what before was just an implicit warranty. 
An example of the relevance of the “monetization” 
of mortgage-backed securities by the Government 
Sponsored Entities is the statement of a typical 
American money market fund one year later. 
At the end of the 2009 fiscal year, the money 
market fund TIAA-CREFF (ticker: TIRXX) had 39.6% 
of its assets in securities issued by them. Recent 
data released by the Fed and quoted in the Wall 
Street Journal article “Absent Help, More Funds 
Might Have Broken Buck” by Ben Levisohn and 
Daisy Maxey on December 1, 2010 shows 
that nine out of the ten largest money market 
fund companies in the United States at the time 
of the crisis, managers of two-thirds of the total 
assets invested in money market funds at that 
moment, used a first-aid program from the Fed 
called the “Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Money-Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility.” 
Under that program, the funds sold securities to 
commercial banks in order to solve their liquidity 
programs, and the banks used funds from the 
Fed to make such purchases. That is more 
evidence of the amount of “de-monetization” 
that happened in financial markets at the end 
46 Universidad Libre
The Austrian Business Cycle Theory and the recent financial crisis
of 2008 following the panic provoked by the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers.      
3.9 WHAT IS THE PROPER RESPONSE 
TO AN ECONOMIC CRISIS?
If the government monopolistically controls the 
supply of money, what should the government’s 
“proper” response be in case of a perceived 
increase in the demand for money in the middle 
of an economic crisis?
Is it proper for the government to increase (again) 
the money supply in order to match the increased 
demand? Or is the proper response, Fiat justitia 
ruat caelum?19.
   
If the government keeps the supply of money 
constant in face of an increased demand for 
money, or worse, allows its contraction, it will 
force asset liquidations beyond what may be 
understood as the misallocations that need to 
be corrected, producing even bigger economic 
devastation, human suffering, and social unrest.
If the government supplies extra money to 
meet its estimations of demand, it will result 
in a plethora of other bad things: a) it will 
generate an excess supply of money as soon as 
confidence is restored, unless the government 
“mops up” further down the road the excess 
supplied (something to be skeptical about); b) 
given the non-neutral characteristic of money, it 
will result in other misallocations; and c) it may 
generate all sorts of privileges, moral hazards, 
and increases in the size of the state sector, to 
name a few. 
Having said all that, it is the argument presented 
here that under today’s institutional framework of 
fiat money, legal forced tender, and central bank, 
the proper action for the government to take is to 
attend to the increased demand for money with 
an increase in the money supply, such a course of 
action being justified, by prudential reasons given 
below, as the lesser evil.
A traditional approach among Austrian 
economists20 to this dilemma is the one of framing 
this discussion as a choice between the alternatives 
of a lengthier or deeper recession. Paul Cwik 
(2009: 8) writes, “It seems that economists and 
policy setters face a trade-off between the length 
of the recession and its depth”.
The three courses of action open to the central 
bank are to expand the supply of money, to keep 
it constant, or to allow it to contract. The expansion 
of the money supply is associated with the option 
of lengthening the recession in order to avoid a 
depression, and the options of maintaining the 
money supply constant or allowing its contraction 
are usually associated with accepting a deeper 
recession, hoping that such a sharp downturn 
will bring a faster correction of the existing 
misallocations and therefore a faster recovery. 
That traditional approach is not disputed with 
this essay, but here I suggest a new element for 
analysis: that is, changes in the demand for money. 
Let us suppose that the preference for holding 
cash balances has not changed significantly 
at the beginning of the recession. In that case, 
keeping the supply of money constant would 
match the existing demand for money. But what if 
19 Fiat justitia ruat caelum is a legal phrase in Latin that may be translated as “Do justice and let the sky fall.” The maxim signifies 
the belief that justice must be realized regardless of consequences. It can have a positive and a negative connotation. In the 
case of judging the proper course of action for the monetary authorities to adopt in case of a higher demand for money due 
to an increase in the uncertainty in middle of an economic crisis, first it must be understood whether it is a case that admits 
a prudential response.
20 Professor Rothbard in Man, the State and the Economy describes the “liquidationist” point of view against the prudential 
response suggested above: “It may well be true that the deflationary process will overshoot the free-market equilibrium point 
and raise price differentials and the interest rate above it. But if so, no harm will be done, since a credit contraction can 
create no malinvestments and there fore does not generate another boom-bust cycle” (Rothbard, 2009: p. 1006). As it is 
argued in this chapter, there are other harms to be considered aside from the generation of another cycle. 
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most of the economic agents have panicked, and 
the desire to hold cash balances has increased 
dramatically in a true “flight to liquidity”? In 
those circumstances, some forms of monetary 
instruments, quasi-money, which were part of the 
money supply because of their liberative power 
(liquidity), may have lost their liquidity once the 
agents started a flight to “hard” money. That is 
the case when investments in credit instruments, 
such as “securitized” credits, corporate bonds, 
mortgages, and treasury bills, held in money 
market mutual funds and regarded as “de facto” 
money, start to be traded or risk being traded 
at a discount when money holders start to move 
their liquidity from money market mutual funds to 
bank deposits or cash. In such cases, according 
to the GAMOE definition of money, should an 
increase in the monetary base that prevents a 
decrease in M2 by compensating the reduction 
in credit by an increase in bank credits with the 
central bank be considered an increase in the 
money supply, or should it be considered simply 
a policy to keep the money supply constant? 
As shown in the figure below, an increase in 
hard money represented by the “True Money 
Supply” had an increase of about Two trillion 
dollars during the recent crisis. The increase of 
monetary instruments in the American economy 
as measured by the concept of “Money of Zero 
Maturity” had an increase of about 1.25 trillion 
dollars, and measured by the “M2”21 concept it 
increased about One trillion billion dollars. These 
numbers suggest that part of the increase in the 
monetary base just compensated the decrease in 
the perception that some credit instruments were 
part of the money supply22.
21 M2 is the concept of money supply that aggregates the 
currency, deposits on demand, overnight investments, 
money market mutual funds and saving accounts.
22 Note that in the case under discussion, if assets held in 
money market mutual funds are sold in order to repay 
investments in those funds that have their shares or units 
redeemed by the investors, it will not alter the immediate 
availability, or maturity of credit. The structure of credit 
remains the same. The loss of monetary properties of 
those classes of assets may force the banks to apply to 
re-discount with the central bank and, in the absence of 
that option, if the discount window is closed, may result 
“Having said all that, it 
is the argument presented 
here that under today’s 
institutional framework of  
fiat money, legal forced tender, 
and central bank, the proper 
action for the government 
to take is to attend to the 
increased demand for money 
with an increase in the money 
supply, such a course of  action 
being justified, by prudential 
reasons given below, as the 
lesser evil.”
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Cont. nota 22
 in a forced liquidation of those assets. Those will be the alternatives every time that there is an explicit or implicit warranty 
of the financial institutions that the investors in money market mutual funds have a “debt” claim against the banks and not an 
equity position. This work is not the place to discuss the policies followed by the Fed during the recent financial crisis, but in 
evaluation the course of action followed, one must keep in mind the understanding that if the investors in money market mutual 
funds had had the perception that the principal of their investments had been at risk, the “flight to liquidity” would have been 
much greater than what it actually was (with catastrophic and unpredictable consequences for the entire financial system). 
of individual preferences. In the framework of 
competitively provided commodity money, these 
preferences may be accommodated by an 
increase or decrease respectively (i) in the supply 
of money, (ii) in the preference for cash balances 
or, (iii) by a change in the purchasing power of 
the commodity money. Professors Barnett and 
Block say, “The optimum quantity of money is 
not, then, whatever quantity happens to exist, but 
rather whatever amount of gold as coins the free-
market process creates” (2004: 48).
If this interpretation is correct, then it may be 
accepted from an Austrian Economics standpoint 
that it is not any existing quantity of money in 
use by society at a given time that performs 
the services desired by the economic agents, 
but fluctuations in the supply and demand for 
money should accommodate the sum of personal 
preferences like the functions of demand and 
3.10 FINAL REMARKS ABOUT  THE 
CHANGES IN DEMAND FOR MONEY
The course of action of expanding the monetary 
base by “quantitative easing” has terrible 
consequences as mentioned above, even if it is just 
to keep the money supply constant in the broad 
sense of GAMOE used here. Therefore, if under 
the current monetary arrangements in place almost 
everywhere in the world, the best thing that can be 
done is a terrible thing, a case may be made that 
the entire institutional edifice of a state-controlled 
monopoly of the money supply is a flawed one and 
a new monetary constitution must be thought out. 
However, it seems to be implicit in a praxeological 
analysis about the demand for money, understood 
as the aggregation of the individual preferences 
for cash balances, that the “optimum” amount 
of money is a consequence of the aggregate 
Figure 2. True Money Supply (TMS) vs. MZM Money Stock vs. M2 Money Stock
Source: Ludwig von Mises Institute.
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supply for any other good. And as with any other 
good, these preferences may vary, resulting in 
short-term disequilibrium. 
3.11 WHAT WOULD BE A FUNCTION 
OF THE DEMAND FOR MONEY 
FROM AN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 
PERSPECTIVE UNDER THE CURRENT 
MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH 
FIAT MONEY?
As stated above, in principle, it does not seem 
that the postulate of “any amount of money is as 
good as any other” holds water in the specific 
case of commodity money. If the postulate that 
any amount of money that happens to be in use 
in society is the optimum amount of money were 
not even valid for commodity money, what would 
be a general “demand function for money” from 
an Austrian economics perspective? As stated 
above, the aggregate of individual preferences 
will intersubjectively determine how the supply 
and demand for money will be accommodated 
regardless of the specific monetary regime 
enforced. Violent changes in the preferences for 
cash balances will generate violent changes in 
prices and quantities traded plus or minus the 
variation in the money supply according to the 
established rule.  
But if that is so, from an Austrian economics 
perspective, what can be said about the demand 
for money under monetary arrangements of fiat 
money in which the cost of creating money is 
marginally insignificant and there is no constant 
rule for the money supply such as the one 
mentioned in the example above? 
In the imperfect markets of the mixed-economy 
societies today, all sorts of rigidities and limitations 
are imposed on the free exchange of goods and 
services and, needless to say, the labor market is 
one of the most regulated markets by far. Under 
the just-mentioned circumstances, a case may be 
made that when society is in a downturn as part of 
a business cycle, the cost of making any adjustment 
of supply and demand of goods and services by 
deflation is relatively more expensive than allowing 
the adjustment to happen keeping the purchasing 
power of the money constant. Keeping prices stable 
during a downturn is a relatively less expensive 
solution, and it is a hypothesis that results from the 
fact that adding fiat money to the money supply is 
relatively cheap. That, in the face of an increase 
in the demand for money, a non-flexible money 
supply will force the prices down is indisputable. 
Why it is so painful, however, is a legitimate 
source of controversy. That this phenomenon has 
a psychological origin may well be assumed; after 
all, it is a common behavior observed in different 
times and places. It may be ventured that the 
economic agents have a sense of entitlement to 
the relative value of their goods and skills and, 
generally speaking, are reluctant to be the first to 
accept a loss in what they perceive as the “current” 
price of their property, individually, that is not in 
their interest. Professor Yeager, argues: 
“Elements of price and wage stickiness, though 
utterly rational from the individual points of view of 
the decisions-makers involved, do keep downward 
price and wage adjustments from absorbing the 
full impact of the reduced willingness to spend 
associated with efforts to build or maintain cash 
balances” (Yeager, 1983: p. 306).
The fact is that the trend towards a lower price 
level in order to match an increased preference 
for money to a constant money supply is expected 
to produce a decrease in production since prices 
are not, due to the circumstances mentioned 
above, as elastic to the downside as they are to 
the upside. Price stability in times of crisis can be 
achieved by increasing the supply of money in 
order to accommodate an increased demand for 
cash balances in the economy23.
23 Professor George Selgin in the introduction to Leland Yeager’s Fluttering Veil argues that it is not only in a mixed economy 
that a downward rigidity in prices is to be found. He argues that it is a consequence of a “network externality”; that “… each 
seller has an incentive to wait for others to go first in making desirable adjustments” (Yeager, 1997: XVI).
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All the analysis presented so far seems to fit fairly 
as a description of reality from the perspective 
of Austrian economics. Now it is time to deal 
with the normative side of this problem. Since 
any increase in the demand for cash balances 
in a regime of state monopoly of money must 
be supplied to the money holders by the central 
bank through the banking system, a normative 
position is adopted in the next section of this 
paper.
24 In order to evaluate to what extent a financial crisis may or may not justify extraordinary measures, it seems relevant here to 
keep in mind Ayn Rand’s definition of emergency: 
 “An emergency is an unchosen, unexpected event, limited in time that creates condition under which human survival is 
impossible…. In an emergency situation, men’s primary goal is to combat the disaster, escape the danger and restore 
normal conditions…. By ‘normal’ conditions I mean metaphysically normal, normal in the nature of things, and appropriate 
to human existence…. By its nature, an emergency situation is temporary… the principle that one should help men in an 
emergency cannot be extended to regard all human suffering as an emergency and to turn the misfortune of some into a 
first mortgage on the lives of others” (Rand, 1963: p. 55).
25 Professor Robert Higgs describes in chapter eight, “The Great Depression: ‘An Emergency More Serious than War’,” the ways 
in which an artificial crisis was created by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt soon after his inauguration in March 1933 
(claiming dubious powers given by the “Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917”) by proclaiming a banking holiday (Higgs, 
1987: p. 170). Abuses such as that and others carried on by Roosevelt under the “New Deal” such as the seizure of gold 
and the devaluation of the gold content of the United States dollar were largely avoided during the recent financial crisis. 
26 Obviously the monetary constitution of the United States is not the same today as it was at the time of the founding. In 1913 
with the establishment of the Fed, a major change, one may say a constitutional change (if not formally, at least de facto) 
was introduced. At the end of World War I, under the new monetary regime, a first important change was introduced when
4. THE REASONS FOR ADVOCATING A PRUDENTIAL RESPONSE
4.1 A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES
Can the current (or any) economic crisis be 
considered an emergency case, such as an 
armed conflict?24. Do circumstances in which the 
principles under which civil society are based on 
not apply because civility was replaced by a state 
of war?25. Apparently not; therefore, the solution 
for an economic crisis must be consistent with the 
principles best-suited to organizing a society of 
human beings. 
Has this current economic crisis changed the 
paradigm of a pluralistic society, based on private 
property rights, with a representative government 
limited by individual rights as the best society for 
human flourishing? The answer is also no, no new 
argument in favor of replacing a spontaneous 
order for an order of command was offered.
Nonetheless, the response to the current crisis 
worldwide has been more protectionism (so far 
mild), industrial subsidies, financial regulation, 
and fiscal and monetary stimuli. Are they not 
against the principles of an open society and 
free markets? It seems to be beyond any doubt 
that commercial protectionism, subsidies, and 
protection for non-competitive industries or 
political favorites and increased governmental 
expenditures are against the principles of limited 
government best suited for a society of free and 
responsible individuals, and no aspect of reality 
seems to justify departing from those principles. 
But are the bailouts of banks and insurance 
companies by governmental loans financed 
by massive increases of the public debt or 
straightforward increases of the money supply in 
a narrow sense (“quantitative easing”) also not 
regrettable? Yes, they are regrettable, but here the 
answer may be nuanced. For good or evil, the 
law of the land in the United States, for instance, 
has been one of a state monopoly of the money 
supply, legal forced tender, fractional reserve 
banking, and central bank since 1913 when the 
System of Federal Reserve (Fed) was created26.
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Any decision by the central bank to close the 
discount window and to prevent the financial 
institutions from gaining access to hard money, 
even surrending as guarantee well-performing 
assets that they may have, would in practice 
represent a contraction of the liquidity in the 
economy, forcing a deflationary adjustment 
beyond the adjustment necessary in the structure of 
production in order to correct the malinvestments 
done in the upturn of the business cycle. In a 
now-famous article, Hayek talking in 1937 about 
the Great Depression argued that “a movement 
towards more liquid types of money causes an 
actual decrease in the total supply of money,” 
and under those circumstances, the proper thing 
for the central bank to do is to “offset … as far as 
possible the effect of changes in the demand for 
liquid assets on the total quantity of the circulating 
medium” (Miller, 2009: 32)27.
It seems that a case may be made that there 
is a difference between not supporting the 
malinvestments made during the boom stage 
of the cycle with easy money and not allowing 
the supply of money to decrease, which, under 
fractional reserve and central bank arrangements, 
may imply increasing the amount of hard 
money in order to compensate for the increased 
preference for liquidity. Contrary to what would 
Cont. note 26
 the gold standard was replaced by a gold-exchange 
standard. A second relevant change to the monetary 
institutions of the United States post-1913 was the 
adoption of a fixed parity adopted in 1944 with the 
Bretton Woods treaty. A third fundamental change 
was the denunciation of that treaty in 1972 and the 
adoption of a free floating currency. Important as these 
changes were, they did not change substantially the 
current monetary constitution of the country introduced 
in 1913, which has been in place for almost a century. 
If nothing else, these three changes consubstantiate the 
trend towards fiat money completed in 1972.
27 Specifically about the desirability of deflation, Hayek 
was quoted in a recent article by Larry White (2008: 
p. 27) as saying that “I would no longer maintain, as 
I did in the early ‘30s, … a short period of deflation 
may be desirable. Today I believe that deflation has no 
recognizable function whatever, and that there is no 
justification for supporting or permitting a process of 
deflation” (Hayek, 1975: p. 5).
“It seems to be beyond 
any doubt that commercial 
protectionism, subsidies, and 
protection for non-competitive 
industries or political favorites 
and increased governmental 
expenditures are against 
the principles of  limited 
government best suited 
for a society of  free and 
responsible individuals, and 
no aspect of  reality seems to 
justify departing from those 
principles.”
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have happened under a regime of competitive 
supply of money –that is, an increased demand 
for money would be matched by an increased 
production of coins (see Barnett and Block, 
2004: 48)– under a governmental monopoly 
of the money supply, only the government can 
at least try to act as the private suppliers would 
have done. That the government cannot mimic 
the spontaneous actions of economic agents in a 
free marketplace goes without saying, but that is 
part of the argument against the entire regime of 
fractional reserve bank and central banking and 
not an argument against trying to alleviate the 
bad consequences of the existing regime while it 
is still in force. 
If, given the lack of knowledge that the central 
bankers possess and the non-neutral character of 
money, it is impossible to know if an increase in 
the money supply is upholding investments that 
should be liquidated or avoiding unnecessary 
deflation, it seems again an argument against the 
regime that leaves such an action as the least 
disastrous course to follow and not an argument 
against taking such a course, if the circumstances 
are as described. 
Professor Huerta de Soto (2006: 455) reminds 
us that “Hayek himself admitted that, under 
certain circumstances, a situation might become 
so desperate that politically the only remaining 
option would be to intervene again…”; which 
brings us to the issue of which “type of monetary 
expansion would be the least disturbing from an 
economic standpoint?” 
So, it is not alien to Austrian economists to accept 
that cases of “special circumstances” that may 
require nuanced responses can happen, and in the 
remaining pages a nuanced response to increased 
demand for liquidity observed more acutely after 
September 2008 is framed. The way proposed 
to identify what could be a principled response 
to the special circumstances of that emergency 
is appealing to the virtue of prudence. At a time 
that most observers were commenting about the 
increase in the money supply, the fact that such an 
increase was not enough to compensate for the 
“It has been accepted by 
the majority of  the economic 
profession that the current 
financial arrangements of  
a fractional reserve banking 
system with a central bank 
with the legal mandate 
to act as a lender of  last 
resort are the most efficient 
arrangements for money and 
banking possible.”
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increase in the demand for liquidity passed almost 
unobserved. Such lack of perception about the 
relevance of the “flight to liquidity” in terms of an 
increase in the demand for money, as argued in the 
introduction of this paper, may be considered one 
of the two main monetary phenomena  explaining 
the current financial crisis. 
4.2 THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE
Prudence nowadays is understood as equivalent 
to utility maximization, but in pre-modern times, 
it was not only one of the four cardinal virtues 
(along with justice, courage, and temperance), 
but it was also considered the supreme virtue. The 
sense in which prudence is utilized in this paper is 
its pre-modern one, or more precisely, according 
to the teachings of Aristotle, as an intellectual 
virtue. In Aristotle’s words: “Prudence is that virtue 
of the understanding which enables men to come 
to wise decisions about the relation to happiness 
of the goods and evils that have been previously 
mentioned” (Aristotle, 1941: 1366b 19-22).
In a modern, “neo-Aristotelian” definition: “… 
Prudence is the intelligent management of the 
components needed for living a good human 
life. As we have argued, some of the components 
are given by nature, others by our environment, 
and still others are fashioned by the logic of our 
own choices” (Den Uyl, 1991: 267).
It is in the sense in which self-perfection is the 
way to achieve a good life, that ‘prudence,’ with 
the meaning of ‘practical wisdom’ adopted in this 
paper, may be understood as the most important 
of the cardinal virtues. And it is in this sense that 
an appeal for an “intelligent management” of the 
circumstances in order to restore, maintain, and 
develop the best conditions possible for a good 
life may be understood as principle for action in 
the context of our discussion.
4.3 THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT
In a regime of state monopoly fiat money, central 
bank, and fractional banking, the central bank 
has the obligation to act as lender of last resort 
for the financial system. This obligation is a legal 
obligation, but more than that, it is a logically 
necessary consequence of the existing structure of 
the financial system. As stated by Professor Huerta 
de Soto, “The very existence of a fractional-
reserve banking system invariably leads to the 
emergence of a central bank as a lender of last 
resort” (Huerta de Soto, 2006: p. 638). 
It has been accepted by the majority of the 
economic profession that the current financial 
arrangements of a fractional reserve banking 
system with a central bank with the legal mandate 
to act as a lender of last resort are the most efficient 
arrangements for money and banking possible. 
Actually, as argued in Bagehot’s “Lombard 
Street,” that has been the predominant view in 
the profession since Peel’s Act of 1844 granted 
a monopoly of the money supply for the Bank 
of England in exchange for its role as lender of 
last resort. It became the underpinning of the 
financial systems of the entire world, allowing 
the mobilization of financial resources in an 
unprecedented scale, fueling the progress of 
mankind28.
However, neither recourse to authority nor the 
number of supporters of one idea proves its validity; 
and the dissonant voices of Austrian economists 
have incessantly pointed out the shortcomings of 
the current monetary arrangements adopted with 
variations globally.
But what needs to be made clear in relation to the 
monetary expansion post-2007 promoted by the 
central banks in the United States, Europe, Asia, 
28 It is disputable whether Bagehot in his book was making an apology for central banking or, on the contrary, was actually 
calling attention to the real underpinning of British financial markets (trust) and the inherent fragility of the fractional reserve 
system in place.
54 Universidad Libre
The Austrian Business Cycle Theory and the recent financial crisis
etc., is that it is an integral part of the financial 
systems as they are currently structured.
The specifics of the different forms by which a 
central bank may provide liquidity for the financial 
system are not part of what has been discussed 
in this paper. For the purposes of describing 
the relations between monetary changes and 
the different stages of the business cycle, suffice 
it to say that if most of lending is now done 
outside regular commercial banks, it is only to 
be expected that the central banks will provide 
liquidity for financial transactions outside the 
regular banking system as well. In the same way, 
it is not part of the inquiry conducted in this paper 
to analyze the correctness of the different actions 
taken by all central banks in general or the Fed in 
particular; however, the perception that privileges 
and moral hazards are a necessary consequence 
of the process must be weighted in any evaluation 
of the current system.
4.4 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE 
ACTIONS OF THE CENTRAL BANKS 
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS
A first conclusion that can be reached is that in 
providing liquidity for the financial system, even 
if that was done outside the traditional lines of 
rediscount for commercial banks, the central 
banks in general and the Fed in particular are 
honoring their legal and logical obligation of 
acting as lender of last resort for the financial 
system as they are currently organized. 
Having the money supply29 increased by the 
central bank in order to provide liquidity for 
financial institutions is no more an evil per se 
than any other essential feature of the current 
monetary constitution. It must be understood that 
it is not an optional feature of the system, but a 
defining component of it, and, therefore, it cannot 
be evaluated apart from the rest of the monetary 
arrangements in place.
A second conclusion is that even if the increase 
in the money supply in order to provide liquidity 
for the financial system comes to be understood 
as something wrong per se, a vision shared by 
many sensible persons, still  it must be evaluated 
in the context of the entire financial system of 
which it is an essential feature. 
A third conclusion is that if the process of increasing 
the money supply in order to provide liquidity for 
the financial system is understood, as the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory does, as a source of further 
misallocations, as a source of inefficiencies, 
privileges, and moral hazard –in sum, if it comes 
to be understood as an unpardonable flaw– it 
means a condemnation of the entire edifice. If 
it comes to be accepted that fractional banking 
cannot subsist without a lender of last resort and 
that this lender of last resort may not have another 
instrument to fund its operations other than the 
printing machine, it must be understood as a 
condemnation of fractional reserve banking and 
not of last resort lending. 
4.5 FINAL COMMENTS
The current monetary constitutions in the 
United States, Europe, and everywhere are 
not the ideal monetary arrangements for a free 
society. Nonetheless, they command enormous 
legitimacy, so that claims for the abolition 
of the forced course of the currency and the 
closing of the central bank are not yet part of 
the circle of the commonly accepted discourse. 
The different national financial systems are 
part of the economic backbone that sustains 
the current level of division of labor and 
consequent production without which the life 
of billions would be compromised. Therefore, 
while the current monetary constitution remains 
29 Most of the monetary expansion done in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman debacle was done by crediting the deposit 
accounts of financial institutions with the central bank; those deposit accounts are part of the monetary base and therefore of 
the money supply.
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in place, any decision by the central bank of 
not providing more liquidity for the banks, and, 
consequently, forcing all the economic agents, 
in their increased demand for cash balances, 
to compete for a fixed supply of money would 
represent an additional effort of adaptation from 
society on top of the effort required to liquidate 
all the existing misallocations. Depending on the 
severity of the crisis, it is difficult to exaggerate 
the dire consequences for the well-being of the 
economic agents of forcing down the prices in 
the market30.
The progress of socialist and totalitarian 
experiments represented by the New Deal, 
Fascism, and Nazism, plus, World War II, the 
Holocaust, and the subjugation of East Europe by 
Soviet Imperialism come to mind as some of the 
dire consequences that happened last time that 
the central banks failed to live up to their promises 
and left the financial systems worldwide to be 
almost completely destroyed, with the resulting 
bankruptcies of thousands of financial institutions 
in the United States alone. Any decision by the 
central bank of renouncing its obligations would 
conspire against the economic foundations of the 
different nations around the globe. At this time, it 
seems bloodily clear that the best course of action 
possible under the current arrangements is the 
lesser of two evils and not a clear-cut position. But 
once the aprioristic assumptions of the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory are accepted –that money 
is not neutral and that financial flows in the end 
simply mirror transactions in the real economy– 
then it necessarily follows that it is not possible to 
create capital from a printing machine. Therefore, 
the fact that the best course of action possible is 
one that does not solve the problem, but one that 
simply does not aggravate it, must be understood 
as a definitive flaw of the current arrangement and 
a most powerful indictment of it, a most powerful 
claim for its revamping. 
30 About that the lesson of Mises is: “Deflation and credit 
contraction no less than inflation and credit expansion 
are elements disarranging the smooth course of 
economic activities” (Mises, 2007: p. 567).
“Therefore, while the current 
monetary constitution remains 
in place, any decision by the 
central bank of  not providing 
more liquidity for the banks, 
and, consequently, forcing all 
the economic agents, in their 
increased demand for cash 
balances, to compete for a 
fixed supply of  money would 
represent an additional effort 
of  adaptation from society 
on top of  the effort required 
to liquidate all the existing 
misallocations. ”
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